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A recent Time article warned readers that ―[g]overnment agents can 
sneak onto your property in the middle of the night, put a GPS device on 
the bottom of your car and keep track of everywhere you go.‖1  While this 
may strike some as Orwellian alarmism, the article was reporting on a 
Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Pineda-Moreno,
2
 in which a three 
judge panel held that evidence obtained from a GPS device that 
government agents had secretly installed on the defendant‘s car was 
admissible at trial.
3
  In his outraged dissent, Chief Judge Kozinski declared 
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 1. Adam Cohen, The Government Can Use GPS to Track Your Moves, TIME.COM 
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2013150,00.html. 
 2. 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 3. Id. at 1215. 
 that ―1984 may have come a bit later than predicted, but it‘s here at last.‖4  
The majority, however, held that the defendant, Juan Pineda-Moreno, had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway, rendering a warrant 
unnecessary.
5
   
Individual expectations of privacy have for many years provided the 
doctrinal foundation of Fourth Amendment search analysis.
6
  These 
expectations shift with one‘s location and activity;7 similarly, societal 
expectations of privacy have shifted with changes in technology.
8
  
Consequently, the use of GPS tracking devices
9
 has raised sharp questions 
about what level of privacy one might reasonably expect in the movements 
of a car traveling on public roads;
10
 questions that go to the heart of any 
debate on privacy, law enforcement, and government intrusiveness.  The 
debate promises to keep raging as highly invasive technologies become 
widely adopted by both law enforcement and the public.
11
   
                                                          
 4. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, 
C.J., dissenting).   
 5. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(declining to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in a driveway, thereby denying Fourth 
Amendment protection). 
 6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(explaining that, as part one of a two-part analysis, a person must exhibit a subjective 
expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment protections to apply). 
 7. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (stating that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in movements in ―open fields‖).   
 8. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (2010) (holding that a 
cell phone user had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages sent from 
government-issued phone); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986) (noting that 
in this ―age where private and commercial flight in public airways is routine‖ the defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy because anyone flying in the airspace above the 
defendant‘s home could have seen marijuana plants); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
744-46 (1979) (holding that warrantless use of a pen register attached to a phone in order to 
record phone numbers dialed and calls received did not constitute a search because the user 
of the phone assumed the risk when he voluntarily conveyed information to the phone 
company).  But see Kyllo v. United States 533 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2001) (holding that use of a 
thermal imaging device constituted a search because the information was unavailable 
outside the home and therefore offended society‘s expectation of privacy in the home); 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding the same for a beeper used to 
reveal information inside the home).   
 9. See, e.g., Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon:  GPS Device, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 13, 2008, at A1 (describing how police tracked a suspected rapist using a GPS device, 
ultimately leading to his arrest when he was about to attack another victim); Stephen 
Williams, Student Says He Found an FBI Tracking Device on His Car, Automobiles:  
Wheels Blog, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2010, 6:03 PM), 
http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/student-says-he-found-an-fbi-tracking-device-
on-his-car/ (describing how FBI agents retrieved a GPS device from a Muslim college 
student after a mechanic found a suspicious wire during routine maintenance, and noting 
that federal authorities may secretly plant GPS devices on cars in California). 
 10. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985) (holding that an 
automobile‘s ready mobility creates a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless search); 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (stating that a person traveling in a 
vehicle on a public road has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements). 
 11. Cellular phones, for example, allow fairly accurate tracking of the phone‘s location 
via triangulation.  See Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant:  Fourth Amendment 
Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone 
 In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have 
explicitly held that tracking a vehicle‘s movements using a GPS device is 
not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
12
  The Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, however, came to the opposite conclusion 
in its recent decision in United States v. Maynard,
13
 holding that the 
warrantless use of a GPS device to continuously track a suspect for nearly a 
month constituted a search.
14
 In a novel opinion, the court invoked the 
mosaic theory,
15
 more often used in national security law, to determine 
whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
aggregate of his movements over an extended period of time.
16
 
This Note will analyze the Maynard decision, describing the facts and 
procedural history of the case, then examining the court‘s analysis of 
precedent and its application of mosaic theory to GPS surveillance.  It will 
focus on the utility of mosaic theory as an addition to Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, and suggest that courts continue to use the theory and develop 
refinements for the GPS context as they continue to wrestle with the 
reconciliation of technology and the Fourth Amendment.
17
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard were charged with conspiracy to 
distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine 
base.
18
  At trial, the government used tracking information obtained from a 
                                                          
Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1068 (2010) (explaining that triangulation works 
through cellular towers sending signals to a user‘s cell phone and measuring elements of the 
response). 
 12. See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding 
that placing a tracking device on the vehicle ―merely allowed the police to reduce the cost of 
lawful surveillance‖); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that placing a tracking device on a vehicle is simply a substitute for police following 
the vehicle), reh’g denied 617 F.3d 1120 (2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 
(7th Cir. 2007) (analogizing GPS tracking with surveillance cameras and satellite imaging to 
determine that it is not a search as defined by the Fourth Amendment).  
 13. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) reh’g denied 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 14. Id. at 555-56.   
 15. Mosaic theory describes the concept that individual actions may not rise to the level 
of a search in and of itself, but may constitute a search when aggregated.  Orin Kerr, D.C. 
Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” Of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a 
Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010 2:46 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-
holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search/.   
 16. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.  The court determined that although Jones‘s individual 
movements were exposed to the public, what the whole of those movements revealed was 
not exposed, thus giving rise to an expectation of privacy.  Id.   
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F. 3d 989, 1006 
(9th Cir. 2009) (describing the difficulty for courts in striking a fair balance for searches of 
electronic records when precedent addresses only searches of paper documents, which are 
necessarily more limited in the amount of information that can be obtained) aff’d in part 
rev’d in part en banc 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).   
 18. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 548–49. 
 GPS device placed on Jones‘s vehicle to establish a pattern in his activity19 
that, when combined with his cell phone records, ―paint[ed] a picture of 
Jones‘s movements that made the allegation that he was involved in drug 
trafficking‖ credible.20  The sequence of Jones‘s movements revealed more 
than what a few individual movements could have shown; taken together, 
the movements created a picture of his drug trafficking operation.
21
   
Although the police had obtained a warrant to install the GPS device in 
the District of Columbia, they actually installed it in Maryland after the 
warrant had expired.
22
   
Jones and Maynard jointly appealed several issues, none of which the 
court found merited reversal of the trial court‘s conviction.23  Jones 
individually argued that the court erred in admitting the evidence acquired 
from the warrantless use of the GPS device for a period of four weeks.
24
  
The court agreed with Jones that the prolonged use of GPS surveillance 
violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and rose to the level of a 
search under the Fourth Amendment,
25
 thereby requiring the reversal of 
Jones‘s conviction.26 
II. ANALYSIS 
In Maynard, the court wrestled with an emergent tension in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine: although little or no expectation of privacy exists in 
public,
27
 through technology, the government has the ability to monitor 
individuals in public continuously and indefinitely, a situation much 
                                                          
 19. Id. at 562. 
 20. Id. at 567. 
 21. Id. at 567-68.  To the court, the trial transcript was indicative of how the 
prosecution had used the GPS information: 
They had to figure out where is he going?  When he says ten minutes, where is he 
going?  Again, the pattern developed. . . .  And I want to . . . just show you an 
example of how the pattern worked. . . .  The meetings are short.  But you will 
again notice the pattern you will see in the coming weeks over and over again.  Id. 
at 562 (quoting Transcript of Record at #, United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. #) . [OH:  Please determine if the Trial Transcript can be 
found and fill in the appropriate information where # is indicated according to rule 
10.8.3.]   
 22. Id. at 566.  The decision does not address whether the search would have been 
constitutional if the officers had obtained a warrant after installing the GPS device, but 
before using it to track Jones.  But see United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 
(9th Cir. 2010) (implying that it is the installation of the device that raises the Fourth 
Amendment question rather than the tracking), reh’g denied 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 23. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549. 
 24. Id. at 549, 555.  
 25. See id. at 563 (―Society recognizes Jones‘s expectation of privacy in his movements 
over the course of a month as reasonable, and the use of the GPS device to monitor those 
movements defeated that reasonable expectation.‖). 
 26. Id. at 568. 
 27. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing examples of the Court‘s 
delineation between public and private for purposes of determining whether a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy).   
 different from the kinds of monitoring courts grappled with as the doctrine 
developed.
28
  Using the existing framework leads to the absurd result that 
even the most invasive monitoring technique would never rise to the level 
of a search, so long as it is used in public.
29
  
In addressing this problem, the Maynard court grounded its reasoning in 
the touchstone test of Fourth Amendment doctrine: the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis derived from United States v. Katz.
30
  To 
the court, whether or not Jones exhibited an actual, subjective expectation 
of privacy turned on whether his movements were exposed to the public.
31
  
The court found that although each trip in isolation was exposed to the 
public, the entirety of Jones‘s movements was not, since ―[a] reasonable 
person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of every time 
he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each place he 
stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those 
movements to remain ‗disconnected and anonymous.‘‖32  Therefore, the 
court found that because GPS surveillance reveals a more detailed picture 
of one‘s life than any one person would be expected to have, an expectation 
of privacy in the aggregate of one‘s public movements is reasonable.33   
                                                          
 28. This approach to analyzing reasonable expectation of privacy is deemed the 
―probabilistic model‖ and focuses on the likelihood that the information would be known, or 
become known, to the public or the police.  If the likelihood is low, it is more likely that 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.  See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (2007) (outlining various approaches to 
Fourth Amendment privacy analysis, noting that the Supreme Court often adopts a different 
model depending on the context);  see also Kerr, supra note 15 (stating that the probabilistic 
model does not work in context of technological surveillance).   
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (imagining 
that police could potentially attach surveillance devices to thousands of random cars and 
then analyze the data to seek out suspicious patterns of activity). 
 30. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the 
inquiry for a defendant‘s reasonable expectation of privacy as, first, whether or not the 
defendant exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and second, whether or not 
that expectation was reasonable); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555 (stating that the government 
agreed that the Katz test applied). 
 31. See Maynard 615 F.3d at 558 (―This much is clear, however:  Whether an 
expectation of privacy is reasonable depends in large part upon whether that expectation 
relates to information that has been ‗expose[d] to the public.‘‖ (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 
351)); see also April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case For 
Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the 
Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 686 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court‘s 
justification for limiting the Fourth Amendment‘s application in public—based on the 
rationale that an individual knowingly exposes themselves when in public—places 
significant limitations on the Fourth Amendment‘s reach).   
 32. Maynard 615 F.3d at 563 (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 
772 (N.Y. 1970)).   
 33. The court based its conclusion on two main points.  First, the court determined that 
―unlike one‘s movements during a single journey, the whole of one‘s movements over the 
course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will 
observe all those movements is effectively nil.‖  Id. at 558.  Second, the court reasoned that 
the ―whole of one‘s movements is not exposed constructively even though each individual 
movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—
than does the sum of its parts.‖  Id.; see also supra note 15 (describing mosaic theory); 
 The court likened the aggregate of Jones‘s movements to a mosaic,34 
where the whole is more than the sum of its parts.  This theory was 
imported from national security cases in which courts grappled with 
determining what kinds of security-related documents could be subject to 
Freedom of Information Act (―FOIA‖) requests.35  In the FOIA context, the 
mosaic theory addresses the fact that ―[d]isparate items of information, 
though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on 
added significance when combined with other items of information.‖36  The 
danger is that a potential adversary could use FOIA to gather individual 
items of information and piece them together to discover and exploit 
vulnerabilities.
37
  In other words, the difference between the whole and its 
individual components ―is not one of degree but of kind.‖38 
Similarly, in Maynard, although Jones did not have an expectation of 
privacy in any one of his individual journeys, the court found that he did 
have an expectation of privacy in the mosaic created over the course of the 
month-long surveillance.
39
  The court explained how a privacy expectation 
arose from this picture of a series of activities, saying that: 
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told 
by any single visit, as does one‘s not visiting any of these places over the 
course of a month.  The sequence of a person‘s movements can reveal 
still more; a single trip to a gynecologist‘s office tells little about a 
woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby 
supply store tells a different story.  A person who knows all of another‘s 
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, 
a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving 
medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political 
groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.
40
 
Indeed, for Jones, his isolated trips to different houses for varying 
periods of time gave rise to a picture that, in aggregate, told a different 
story than those actions viewed individually.  The court‘s method of 
reaching its conclusion through use of the mosaic theory has been criticized 
as unpersuasive, implying that its use was entirely result oriented.
41
  The 
                                                          
supra note 28 (describing probabilistic model).   
 34. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
 35. See, e.g., id. (examining the justification for the mosaic theory in the national 
security context, and noting that ―[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of 
great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene‖ (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 36. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005).  
 37. See id. (citing the government‘s use of mosaic theory to foreclose access to 
documents requested by the public). 
 38. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
 39. Id. at 563.   
 40. Id. at 562. 
 41. See Kerr, supra note 15 (arguing that the approach in Maynard is not persuasive in 
 importation of the concept, however, is a revolutionary addition to the 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudential framework and courts should develop 
the theory further in order to address some of the emerging legal questions 
arising from sophisticated, technologically-based surveillance. 
A. Mosaic Theory as an Analytical Tool in the Katz Framework 
The mosaic theory is a novel and much-needed addition to the traditional 
Katz framework.
42
  Most notably, the mosaic theory provides an elegant 
solution to the plain view doctrine‘s weakness in failing to meaningfully 
accommodate notions of privacy in public activity.
43
  Courts‘ continued 
insistence that little or no expectation of privacy exists in plain view 
coupled with the development of advanced monitoring techniques threatens 
to turn the Fourth Amendment into an instrument of oppression by the 
government, rather than a protection against it.   
As the Supreme Court noted in Kyllo v. United States,
44
 ―the [Fourth 
Amendment] rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated 
systems that are already in use or in development.‖45  The mosaic theory 
does not preclude the possibility that reasonable expectations of privacy 
could shift as GPS and other monitoring technologies become more 
pervasive.
46
  Rather, it protects the Fourth Amendment from innocuous 
erosion by society‘s ready adoption of such technology since it recognizes 
that privacy may exist in the aggregate of one‘s movements, despite their 
inherently public character.  This privacy expectation could still exist even 
as use of GPS devices becomes a social norm.
47
   
In setting out the foundation of its holding, the Maynard court was 
careful to address the plain view doctrine as it applies to vehicles traveling 
on public roads.  In particular, the court focused on United States v. 
                                                          
part because of the challenge of defining the scope of the mosaic and the possibility of 
creating ―retroactive unconstitutionality‖). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 288 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (stating that electronic surveillance techniques may implicate ―especially 
sensitive‖ Fourth Amendment concerns); Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts?  
GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 419 UCLA L. REV. 409, 421 (2007) (arguing 
that foreseeable advances in GPS technology must be considered in determining the limits 
of Fourth Amendment protection). 
 43. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (discussing inability of traditional Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to address changes in technology). 
 44. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 45. Id. at 36. 
 46. See Hutchins, supra note 42, at 419 (noting that GPS technology has become a 
standard addition to cellular phones).   
 47. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951, 
960 (2009) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007)) (stating that surveys indicate many 
people are comfortable with routine surveillance in commercial settings because they have 
experienced it firsthand). 
 Knotts,
48
 an important precedent for the other circuits‘ holdings on GPS 
surveillance.
49
  Knotts involved the use of a beeper to track a defendant 
suspected of drug trafficking; the court concluded that there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the isolated act of driving from the 
chemical company to the cabin: 
A person traveling in an automobile on a public thouroughfare[] has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.  When [the defendant] traveled over public streets he voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling 
over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops 
he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public 
roads onto private property.
50
   
Notably, the Knotts court reserved the question of whether twenty-four 
hour surveillance in a similar manner would constitute a search.
51
   
The characteristics of GPS and other similar monitoring techniques 
mandate a more nuanced approach than the public/private distinction drawn 
in Knotts and similar cases.
52
  Unlike the scenario in Knotts, where the use 
of the beeper augmented the police officers‘ sensory perceptions, GPS 
surveillance has the ability to completely replace human perception.
53
  In 
                                                          
 48. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).   
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(applying Knotts despite the hesitancy of some state supreme courts to allow the use of 
tracking devices under state constitutions), reh’g denied 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on Knotts to support the 
proposition that the Fourth Amendment should not bar increased police efficiency created 
by technological advances). 
 50. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.  Additionally, the court noted that the officers were not 
forbidden to ―augment the sensory faculties‖ with technology.  Id. at 282.  See also United 
States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, 2010 WL 4595522, at *7 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010) 
(finding the reasoning in Maynard unconvincing because although GPS surveillance may 
allow law enforcement to capture a quantitatively greater amount of information, the quality 
of the information is the same).   
 51. Specifically, the Court said that ―if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as 
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.‖ Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.  
According to the Maynard court, ―[t]he federal circuits that have held use of a GPS device is 
not a search were not alert to the distinction drawn in Knotts between short-term and 
prolonged surveillance.‖  United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
This reading allowed the court to depart from the Knotts precedent and introduce mosaic 
theory into its Fourth Amendment analysis.  See also Hutchins, supra note 42, at 457 
(―According to the [Supreme] Court, its decision [in Knotts] should not be read to sanction 
‗twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country.‘‖ (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 
283)).  
 52. Supra note 8 and accompanying text (delineating cases that reflect courts‘ 
recognition of modern technology in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).  See also Marc 
Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1349, 1419-20 (2004) (suggesting that many opportunities for privacy exist when one is in 
public space, such as, for example, merging into a crowd).   
 53. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (stating that it would 
require ―millions of additional police officers and cameras on every street lamp‖ for officers 
to actually see what the GPS ―sees‖).  GPS technology uses satellites to precisely pinpoint 
the location, speed, and direction of a vehicle.  The information is stored and can be 
 Knotts, the officers used the beeper as they attempted to maintain actual 
visual contact with the defendant‘s vehicle.54  GPS, on the other hand, does 
not require the presence of an officer; rather, it replaces the officer‘s 
function entirely.
55
   
Freed from the physical constraints of the public/private distinction, 
courts applying a mosaic theory can deal more effectively with the far-
reaching privacy concerns associated with GPS and other monitoring 
devices.  In Pineda-Moreno, formalistic reliance on Knotts led the court to 
ask only if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
driveway.
56
  While a long line of cases holds that one does not,
57
 courts 
need to ask if there is an expectation of privacy when the government‘s 
intrusion goes far beyond a few footsteps in the defendant‘s driveway.58   
The current plain view doctrine also raises the specter of equal 
protection: by the existing logic, people who park their cars in garages 
attached to their homes have a greater expectation of privacy than those 
who park their car in the street.
59
  Mosaic theory has the potential to correct 
                                                          
automatically retrieved at a later time, and inputted into map and spreadsheets.  Ramya 
Shah, From Beepers to GPS:  Can the Fourth Amendment Keep Up with Electronic 
Tracking Technology? 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL‘Y 281, 283-85 (2009).   
 54. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
 55. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting that GPS technology could track a 
person‘s entire travel pattern without any officer participation).  Additionally, the beeper in 
Knotts was on a container purchased by the defendant and placed in the car by the 
defendant, debatably at his own risk, in contrast to the scenario in Maynard, where police 
officers planted the device on Jones‘s car. See Bennett L. Gershman, Privacy Revisited:  
GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure, 30 PACE L. REV. 927, 952-53 (2010) (arguing that it is 
unreasonable to assume that a person has voluntarily conveyed to technology the capacity to 
―see‖ him constantly, and that any assumption of risk is out of place when technology is 
used as a complete substitute for human senses).  On the other hand, it may eventually 
become reasonable to assume that one has voluntarily conveyed to technology the capacity 
to ―see‖ through the purchase of a phone or GPS device.  However, it may be unreasonable 
to assume that one has also ceded procedural protections against the government‘s use of 
what that information reveals. 
 56. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that Pineda-Moreno had done nothing to exhibit an expectation of privacy in his driveway, 
such as installing ―No Trespassing‖ signs or erecting any barrier to prevent someone on the 
street from viewing his driveway), reh’g denied 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).   
 57. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (finding no expectation of 
privacy for marijuana plants visible by the naked eye from 1,000 feet above); Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (holding that an individual has no expectation of 
privacy in an open field). 
 58. The Pineda-Moreno court refused to distinguish between the installation of the GPS 
device and the actual tracking of the suspect.  To the court, the case ended when the device 
was installed.  See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 (―We conclude that the police did not 
conduct an impermissible search of Pineda-Moreno‘s car by monitoring its location with 
mobile tracking devices.‖).  In his dissent from the D.C. Circuit‘s denial of rehearing en 
banc, Judge Kavanaugh indicated that a property-based assessment could be the appropriate 
lens with which to view cases like Maynard, and distinguished Knotts on the ground that the 
defendant did not own the containers where the beeper was installed. United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).   
 59. In his dissent to the Ninth Circuit‘s denial of a rehearing en banc, Chief Judge 
Kozinski recognized this inherent unfairness, attributing it in great part to a lack of 
economic diversity on the bench.  ―When you glide your BMW into your underground 
 this imbalance by allowing courts to recognize more robust privacy 
expectations even in plain view.  In many senses, the theory provides a 
much needed conceptual expansion of traditional tests of privacy. 
B. Determining When an Aggregate of Information is a Search 
Naturally, the next question is ―how do the police know when a mosaic 
has been created such that the sum of law enforcement techniques, when 
aggregated, amount to a search?‖60  Indeed, criticism of using mosaic 
theory for GPS surveillance has centered on the potential difficulty of 
applying the concept in future cases.
61
   
The threshold test for invoking mosaic theory should be whether the 
technology is used by law enforcement to replace direct observation by 
humans.  Once this threshold has been met, courts should develop specific 
factors derived from the traditional privacy analysis to determine when 
prolonged surveillance using technology creates a mosaic that constitutes a 
search.  The Maynard court, for example, looked to whether the 
defendant‘s activities had been actually or constructively exposed to the 
public.
62
  The length of the surveillance was also an important factor to the 
court in its holding.
63
  Courts could look to the level of intrusiveness of the 
technology used;
64
 what degree and extent that a technology replaces law 
enforcement‘s direct observation (given that it does);65 and, the level of 
detail the surveillance reveals.
66
  Using mosaic theory gives courts the 
                                                          
garage or behind an electric gate, you don‘t need to worry that somebody might attach a 
tracking device to it while you sleep.‖ United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 
(9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).  Judge Kozinski further argued ―the Constitution 
doesn‘t prefer the rich over the poor; the man who parks his car next to his trailer is entitled 
to the same privacy and peace of mind as the man whose urban fortress is guarded by the 
Bel Air Patrol.‖ Id.   
 60. Kerr, supra note 15.  
 61. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the mosaic theory provides no clear standards for police 
to determine when the sum of their activities rises to a search). 
 62. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the Maynard court‘s 
reasoning).   
 63. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563-66 (referring to prolonged surveillance that lasted for 
a month repeatedly).   
 64. See, e.g., Renée McDonald Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search:  Intrusiveness and 
the Fourth Amendment, 44 U. RICH. L. REV.  1185, 1188 (2010) (arguing that the Court 
should adopt intrusiveness as the benchmark for determining the existence of a search as 
examined by the functionality of a challenged form of surveillance and its potential for 
public disclosure).   
 65. See Gershaman, supra note 52, at 953-60 (describing state cases in which courts 
distinguished GPS surveillance on the ground of its intrusiveness); see also People v. 
Weaver 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (describing GPS as being able to reveal 
information of ―breathtaking quality and quantity‖).  But see Orin S. Kerr, Searches and 
Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 551 (2005) (arguing that a search 
occurs only at the moment ―information from or about the data is exposed to possible 
human observation‖). 
 66.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 n.5 (2001) (holding that thermal 
imaging of a suspect‘s home amounted to a search because it revealed information that was 
―otherwise imperceptible‖ to the average person outside the home). 
 flexibility to look at many different factors, rather than requiring the 
existence of a search to turn on one factor.  Similarly, the mosaic theory is 
not an overbroad solution because it does not preclude a court from finding 
that GPS surveillance constitutes a search since many factors can control 
the outcome.   
Developing such standards should not prove impossible to the courts and 
to law enforcement.  On the contrary, in the Fourth Amendment context, 
courts have always looked at the mosaics created by various factual 
situations and required that law enforcement officers assess an aggregate of 
activities and circumstances before acting.  For example, courts have 
established flexible standards to determine probable cause
67
 and reasonable 
suspicion.
68
  Moreover, invoking mosaic theory when a technology 
replaces human observation gives the analysis far reaching application, 
allowing courts to address the difficult problems posed by GPS and other 
technologies, including mass surveillance by cameras, cell phones, and 
software.   
CONCLUSION 
The Maynard decision introduces a provocative analytical tool into the 
existing Fourth Amendment framework under Katz.  When technology has 
the power to replace human beings in law enforcement, an individual‘s 
reasonable expectation of privacy requires a more nuanced analysis.  There 
is certainly a need for an addition to the Katz test that recognizes the 
possibility of a reasonable expectation of privacy even when a technology 
has become so pervasive that a notion of privacy under the traditional test 
would be hard to discern, and even when the entire series of actions at issue 
occurred in public.   
Moreover, Fourth Amendment protections should not be chipped away 
by society‘s acceptance of a particular technology.  The mosaic theory 
provides a useful means for resolving these increasingly complex 
problems.  Courts should develop and refine a test for when an aggregate of 
information becomes a mosaic that is a search, and continue to explore the 
application of mosaic theory to existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
 
                                                          
 67. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227, 230-31 (1983) (establishing a totality of the 
circumstances test in determining whether a letter sent to police by an anonymous informant 
provided the basis for finding probable cause to believe suspects‘ car and home contained 
contraband).  In ruling that there was probable cause, the court considered the letter‘s 
accurate and detailed predictions about the suspects‘ travel plans.  Id. at 244. 
 68.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (stating that reasonable suspicion must be 
based on ―specific and articulable facts . . . taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts‖).  Based on these standards, the Court in Terry held that an officer had 
reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk two men after observing them repeatedly peering into 
a store window and then conferring with one another.  Id. at 22-23. 
